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Non-Payoff Monotonic Dynamics in an Evolutionary Game of Courtship
A. Chacoma, M. N. Kuperman, and D. Zanette
Centro Ato´mico Bariloche (CNEA) and Instituto Balseiro and
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cient´ıficas y Te´cnicas,
(8400) Bariloche, Rı´o Negro, Argentina.
We propose an evolutionary coordination game to formalize a simplified model of the evolution of
strategies during human courtship. The dynamics, derived from the consideration of experimental
observations on human social behavior driven by self-esteem, turns out to be non-payoff monotonic.
This property gives rise to nontrivial evolution in the players’ strategies, which we study both
numerically and analytically.
INTRODUCTION
Nature offers a plethora of instances showing that re-
lations between sexes are not always smooth. Extreme
examples are the praying mantis female that cannibalizes
its mate; the male bedbug, that slashes the female’s ab-
domen with a sharp sting; and the toxin-loaded scorpion,
that inoculates a special venom to subdue the female of
the species. Aside from these drastic cases, most species
show conflicting behavioral patterns between males and
females when involved in a mating relation. In general,
male behavior has evolved to crave scoring at any costs.
On the contrary, the female is inclined to ensure viable
offspring. This situation leads to a conflict between sexes
concerning their respective shares in parental investment.
Offspring raising requires a considerable amount of time
and energy, that each parent might attempt to minimize
at the expense of the other.
Humans, for example, require intense cooperation to
raise children to adulthood [1]. They have evolved as
cooperative breeders, and the presence of a helper is of-
ten essential to be able to raise offspring. But the con-
flicts that arise from breeding are not unique to humans.
Whenever fertilization is internal [2], females risk being
deserted even before giving birth to their offspring. Fur-
thermore, as females produce relatively few, large ga-
metes, whereas males produce many small gametes, the
former are much more committed to breeding while the
later are in a better position to desert. Males can invest
time and energy not used in breeding into increasing their
offspring with numerous mates. Male strategy is thus a
fast and short engagement with the female. Females need
adopting a counter-strategy to avoid desertion, and they
insist upon a long engagement period before copulation.
The complexity of the situation is interesting enough to
attempt mathematical modeling. Game theory provides
a suitable frame to discuss the so-called Battle of the
Sexes [3] as a strategic game. Formulating a 2× 2 game
(two players, with two strategies each) where the male
strategies are philandering and faithful, whereas the fe-
male strategies are coy and fast, it was shown that in
a population of coy females, males must be faithful [2].
Among faithful males, however, it would not pay a female
to be coy. This is an example of a coordination game, a
class of games that we discuss in Section .
In most vertebrate species, the engagement of a male
and a female is preceded by courtship. The courtship
process in humans has been analyzed by psychologist
in several studies [4]. In particular, in the first stage
of courtship both genders have equal responsibilities in
the successful evolution of the process. During their ini-
tial approach, the man and the woman make decisions
based on parameters defined by their social conception
and personality, which affect the subsequent course of
the interaction. It was experimentally observed that, in
general, women look for obtaining a stable relationship,
unlike men who try to seduce the female seeking a sexual
partner [5]. These dominant behaviors might have been
socially shaped, and seem to be rooted on evolutionary
paths.
In this paper, we analyze a simplified version of this
problem. We consider two interacting populations: males
and females. While individuals of both sexes seek to en-
gage in a relationship with individuals of the opposite
sex, their expectations are different. Males look for a
direct approach to females, to get involved as soon as
possible in a relation. Females, on the other hand, look
for a more cautious approach, let seduction flourish, test
their potential partners. We consider that both individ-
uals will profit from establishing a relationship, that will
prosper only if both partners match their respective ex-
pectations or strategies. A male will abandon his direct
intent if the female is not immediately responsive, and a
cautious female will generally not accept the approach of
a man with no further intentions than sexual intercourse.
After revisiting the concept of coordination game in Sec-
tion , a mathematical formalization of the problem will
be presented in Section .
The choice of a courtship strategy is expected to
require highly adaptive decision-making abilities [6].
Among the constraints that affect this choice, we focus on
self-esteem, which can be defined as the set of thoughts,
perceptions, feelings about ourselves, built up out of the
collected experience we grasp in every social interaction
along our lives [7]. This self-evaluation directly affects
the way how we relate to others and how we behave in
2social environments. People with different levels of self-
confidence, respond differently when facing the same so-
cial challenges [8, 9]. Self-esteem, moreover, increases
when an individual enlarges his/her record of successful
interactions. In the case of courtship, this fact promotes
the direct approach strategy among men and the oppo-
site strategy among women, who become more selective
when choosing their partners. In other words, the more
successful the players are the more inclined they are to
play their favorite strategy. In order to represent these
aspects we introduce evolutionary game rules where the
probability that an individual adopts either strategy de-
pends on self-esteem. In turn, self-esteem is a function
of the player’s accumulated experience or score. Addi-
tionally, as a way of including social influence effects, we
also consider the possibility of strategy imitation between
males.
COORDINATION GAMES
A coordination game represents a situation in which
players can make their strategies agree with each other
in order to get the highest payoff. In a 2× 2 game, sup-
pose that player A can adopt strategies A1 and A2, and
player B can adopt strategies B1 and B2. Coordination
is possible when the payoffs, shown in Table I, satisfy
A > B, ∆ > Γ, and α > γ, δ > β. In this case, the
strategy combinations {A1, B1} and {A2, B2} are pure
Nash equilibria [2].
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
player A
player B
B1 B2
A1 A,α Γ, γ
A2 B,β ∆, δ
TABLE I: Payoff matrix of a general 2×2 game. In each cell,
the two figures give, respectively, the payoff of player A and
player B for each pair of strategies.
Apart from these two pure Nash equilibria, and de-
pending of the relative values of the payoffs, the coordi-
nation game may also have mixed Nash equilibria. It can
be shown that the mixed strategy where player A chooses
A1 with probability
µ = (δ − β)/(α+ δ − β − γ)
and A2 with probability 1− µ, and player B chooses B1
with probability
ν = (∆− Γ)/(A+∆−B − Γ)
and B2 with probability 1−ν, is also a Nash equilibrium.
Unlike the pure Nash equilibria, however, the mixed equi-
librium is not an evolutionarily stable strategy [10]. This
can be proven by considering the replicator equations of
the game [2], which state that the probabilities µ and ν
evolve according to
µ˙ = µ
(
φA1 − φ¯A
)
, with φ¯A = µφA1 + (1− µ)φA2,
ν˙ = ν
(
φB1 − φ¯B
)
, with φ¯B = νφB1 + (1 − ν)φB2,
(1)
where φA1, φA2, φB1, and φB2, are the average payoffs of
individual strategies, namely
φA1 = νA+ (1− ν)Γ, φA2 = νB + (1− ν)∆
φB1 = µα+ (1 − µ)β, φB2 = µγ + (1− µ)δ.
(2)
The Nash equilibria of the game are also fixed points of
the replicator equations, while stable fixed points of the
equations are Nash equilibria of the game. Equations
(1) has five fixed points, four of them corresponding to
all the possible combinations of pure strategies, and the
fifth corresponding to the mixed strategy. Among them,
only the pure Nash equilibria {A1, B1} and {A2, B2} are
stable.
In the following, we consider a subclass of coordina-
tion games, generally known as the Battle of the Sexes
[3]. In the traditional formulation of this game, two play-
ers –Alice and Bob, say– try to decide how to spend their
holidays together. Alice prefers going to the beach, while
Bob is interested in mountain hiking. Despite this dis-
agreement, however, both would prefer to go to the same
place rather than to different ones. The Battle of Sexes
is defined by the payoff relations A = δ > α = ∆.
THE GAME OF COURTSHIP
As a special case of the Battle of Sexes, we study a
game with two players, male and female, each of them
with two available strategies, direct (D) and indirect (I).
In connection with the courtship process described in the
Introduction, the two strategies are respectively related
to more open and more reserved attitudes. The pay-
off matrix is shown in Table II. While the coordinated
strategies {D,D} and {I,I}, which we associate with mu-
tually successful courtship, are more convenient for the
two players than the other two combinations, it is clear
that the male prefers D and the female prefers I.
In this game, the replicator equations for the proba-
bilities mD and fD that respectively males and females
play D are
m˙D = 2mD(1−mD)(3fD − 1),
f˙D = 2fD(1 − fD)(3mD − 2).
(3)
3❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
male
female
D I
D 2, 1 −1,−1
I −2,−2 1, 2
TABLE II: Payoff matrix of the Battle of Sexes considered in
the text.
(a)
a                 b
c                 d 
(b)
FIG. 1: Flow plots for the game of courtship in the plane of
direct strategy probabilities for male (mD) and female (fD)
corresponding to (a) replicator dynamics, Eqs. (3), and (b)
self-esteem dynamics, Eqs. (7). Labels in the right panel in-
dicate the zones where the initial conditions for the numerical
realizations shown in Fig. 2 were chosen.
As in Section , we can verify the existence of a mixed
Nash equilibrium with probabilities mD = 2/3 and fD =
1/3, apart from the pure Nash equilibria {0, 0} and {1, 1}.
In Fig. 1a, we show a flow plot on the (mD, fD)-plane
corresponding to Eqs. (3).
As stated in the Introduction, however, we are inter-
ested in a different type of dynamics, inspired on the
effects of self-esteem during courtship. We assume that
each individual plays the preferred strategy (D for male
and I for female) with more frequency as his/her self-
esteem grows. Moreover, we propose that self-esteem is
determined by the degree of success (i.e., the total pay-
off) in previous matches. The probability mD of a male
playing D is associated to confidence, and should increase
as his total payoff grows. Meanwhile, the probability fD
of a female playing D is related to her predisposition to
open courtship, and should thus decrease with her total
payoff. Calling ΦM and ΦF the respective total payoffs of
male and female, and taking into account that the proba-
bilities mD and fD must be bounded to the interval [0, 1],
we choose the sigmoidal functions
mD =
1
2
[1 + tanh(ΦM − 1/2)] ,
fD =
1
2
[1− tanh(ΦF − 1/2)] .
(4)
Variations in mD and fD are thus governed by the evo-
lution of ΦM,F which, in turn, is given by the payoff in
each match. Specifically, we have
m˙D = Φ˙M
dmD
dΦM
= φmD
dmD
dΦM
, (5)
and
f˙D = Φ˙F
dfD
dΦF
= φfD
dfD
dΦF
, (6)
where φmD and φfD are the average male and female
payoffs when playing D with probabilities mD and fD
respectively. Putting all these expressions in terms of
mD and fD, we find
m˙D = 2mD(1−mD)(1− 2mD − 3fD + 6mDfD),
f˙D = 2fD(1− fD)(−2 + 3mD + 4fD − 6mDfD).
(7)
These equations have ten fixed points, with five of them
coinciding with those of Eqs. (3). Figure 1b shows the
corresponding flow plot on the (mD, fD)-plane.
Remarkably, the Nash equilibria of the Battle of Sexes
are no longer stable under Eqs. (7). This draws an im-
portant distinction between the replicator dynamics and
the self-esteem dynamics introduced here. The replicator
dynamics is a special case of a broad family of imitation
dynamics called payoff monotonic [11]. The most general
form of imitation dynamics is given by the equations
x˙i = xigi(~x), i = 1, . . . , n,
where xi is the probability of playing a given strategy i
among a set of n strategies, and the functions gi satisfy
n∑
i=1
xigi(~x) = 0,
on the n-dimensional simplex Sn = {~x ∈ R
n | xi >
0∧
∑
i xi = 1}. The condition for this dynamical system
to be payoff monotonic is
gi(~x) > gj(~x)⇔ ai(~x) > aj(~x)
for all i, j. This means that the probability of playing a
given strategy increases more rapidly if the correspond-
ing payoff is higher, at the expenses of the less success-
ful ones. In a series of well-known theorems [2, 11], it
is proven that for payoff monotonic equations (i) Nash
equilibria are fixed points, (ii) strict Nash equilibria are
asymptotically stable, and (iii) fixed points that are sta-
ble are Nash equilibria. Since these statements are not
true for Eqs. (7), we conclude that our courtship dynam-
ics is non-payoff monotonic, even when it was derived
from social behavioral considerations.
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FIG. 2: Four numerical realizations of the game of courtship
for initial conditions in different zones of Fig. 1. Labels a to
d indicate the corresponding zones.
NUMERICAL RESULTS AND THE EFFECTS OF
IMITATION
Equations (7) were formulated assuming that the total
payoff of any single individual evolves according to the
average payoff at each match. Therefore, they do not nec-
essarily capture the effects of “microscopic” fluctuations.
Strictly speaking, moreover, they describe the evolution
of strategy probabilities for a single male-female couple,
while we are interested at analyzing the collective social
dynamics of a population where many individuals of the
two sexes have repeated opportunities of engaging into
the courtship process. These aspects can be explored by
performing agent-based numerical simulations.
We consider different population sizes ranging from 200
to 2000, with an equal number of males and females.
Initially, each male or female strategy is defined by a
probability of playing the direct strategy D, mD and fD.
Through Eqs. (4), these initial probabilities define the
respective initial (preexistent) total payoffs. Here, we
analyze several situations with localized and uniformly
distributed initial strategies.
First, we study the evolution of a population with
strategies concentrated in each of the four regions indi-
cated in Fig. 1b. From any of these initial conditions, the
surviving strategy profile corresponds to one of the stable
fixed points of Eqs. (7). Starting from the conditions in-
dicated as a, the system converges to (0, 1); starting from
b, to (1, 1/2); and starting from c and d, to (1/2, 0). Fig-
ure 2b shows typical evolutions corresponding to single
simulations with 2000 individuals. For these localized ini-
tial conditions, hence, numerical simulations agree with
the expected behavior derived from the equations.
The situation is however different when we start from
uniformly distributed probabilities. In this case, numeri-
cal simulations show that the male population splits into
FIG. 3: Left panel: Flow plot for Eqs. (8). Right panel:
Evolution of direct strategy probabilities in a numerical sim-
ulation for a population of 2000 individuals, for males (mD)
and females (fD). The initial probabilities were uniformly
distributed over the interval (0, 1).
two approximately equal groups, one of them converging
to mD = 0 and the other to mD = 1. The female pop-
ulation exhibits the same behavior with respect to fD.
This result can be understood by noting that, due to the
symmetry of the initial condition, the system behaves at
all times as if each male and female sees the population
of the opposite sex as adopting the average strategy, re-
spectively, fD = 1/2 and mD = 1/2. In fact, replacing
these values in each of Eqs. (7), we get
m˙D = 2mD(1−mD)(1/2−mD),
f˙D = 2fD(1− fD)(1/2− fD).
(8)
The corresponding flow plot, shown in Fig. 3a, agrees
with the numerical observation. Figure 3b displays the
evolution of individual strategies in a single realization.
In order to take into account the effect of social influ-
ence, in the form of imitation, we introduce the probabil-
ity q that, at each match, the participating male chooses
its strategy by adopting the probability of another, ran-
domly chosen male, instead of his own. For q = 0, we
reobtain the original model and, in fact, as q remains
small enough the collective behavior is the same as be-
fore. In particular, from uniformly distributed proba-
bilities, the populations of both sexes split into similar
groups that asymptotically approach the extreme values.
For the sake of comparison with other instances, we call
this asymptotic behavior case A.
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FIG. 4: Frequencies of each one of the three possible asymp-
totic states described in the text (A, B, and C) as a function
of the imitation probability q, out of 1000 realizations for each
value of q. Different curves correspond to population sizes of
N = 200 (full line), 600 (dashed line) and 2000 (dotted line)
individuals. The main plot presents a finite-size analysis col-
lapse of the results, with γ = 0.2 and q0 = 0.87, while the
inset shows the raw results.
As the imitation probability q becomes larger, how-
ever, other kinds of asymptotic behavior emerge. In some
of the realizations, all the male population converges to
mD = 0 while the female population still splits into two
groups that converge to extreme probabilities (case B).
Alternatively, all the males converge to mD = 1 and all
the females to fD = 1/2 (case C). As q grows, the fre-
quency of case A decreases monotonically, while the fre-
quencies of cases B and C, which are statistically iden-
tical to each other, increase. Figure 4 shows the fraction
of realizations that end up in each of the three cases, as
a function of q. We have run 1000 simulations for each
value of q. The inset shows the results for different popu-
lation sizes, while the main plot shows a collapse of these
results obtained from standard finite-size scaling. A well-
defined transition at q0 ≈ 0.87, with a critical exponent
γ = 0.2, is apparent.
As expected, thus, sufficiently frequent imitation be-
tween males leads their whole population to a common
pure strategy. From a uniformly distributed initial con-
dition, the two extreme values mD = 0 and 1 are equally
probable, suggesting that the asymptotic state is con-
trolled by microscopic fluctuations in the initial distribu-
tion of strategies. It is interesting that these two asymp-
totic pure strategies have a mixed collective counterpart
in the female population: for mD = 0, each female in-
distinctly adopts either fD = 0 or 1, while for mD = 1,
all females choose their strategies with equal probabil-
ity, fD = 1/2. This behavioral diversity, no doubt, is to
be ascribed to the non-payoff monotonic nature of the
courtship game.
ANALYTIC APPROACH
In the following, we introduce a mean field-like set of
differential equations for the system studied numerically
in the preceding section. Our aim is to provide an ana-
lytical approach to the results obtained when social in-
fluence is included, and more specifically to check the
existence of a transition between two different regimes,
as shown in Fig. 4. We have seen that, when q = 0,
the mean values of the probabilities of playing direct for
each sex are mD = fD = 1/2. These values are also
valid for the case A, while cases B and C, we have found
(mD, fD) = (0, 1/2) and (1, 1/2), respectively.
We assume that the dynamical behavior of each indi-
vidual can be understood as if each player is confronting
a virtual opponent who adopts the mean strategy of
the population. Thus, each male plays against a female
adopting fD = fD, while each female plays against a
male adopting mD = mD. Moreover, the tendency of
males to be affected by the social environment is quan-
tified by the parameter q that defines the probability of
males of playing mD instead of their own strategy. With
these assumptions, our mean field-like equations read
m˙D = (mD−1)mD(3fD−1)[1−2(1−q)mD−2qmD] ≡ F (mD)
(9)
with fixed points at mD = 0, mD = (1−2qmD)/2(1−q),
and mD = 1 and
˙fD = (3mD − 2)fD(fD − 1)(2fD − 1) ≡ G(fD) (10)
with fixed points at fD = 0, fD = 1/2 and fD = 1.
Next we evaluate the stability of the fixed points in
the above equations. As throughout our simulations fD
always converges to 1/2, we fix fD = 1/2 and analyze the
consistency of the dynamical behavior of the equations
with the numerical results. It turns out that mD = (1−
2qmD)/2(1−q) is unstable for any value of q andmD. As
for the stability of the other two equilibria, Fig. 5 shows
three regions in the (q,mD) plane, that we have named
A, B and C as they are in correspondence with the cases
described in the preceding section. In region A, both
mD = 0 and mD = 1 are stable, while in B and C only
one of the two equilibria are stable, respectively, mD = 0
and mD = 1. In regions B and C, moreover, mD = (1−
2qmD)/2(1− q) adopts values outside the interval [0, 1].
Consequently, for q < 1/2 the two extreme values of mD
are stable. For q > 1/2, on the other hand, a departure
of mD from 1/2 can lead the system to select only one of
these two values. This analysis helps us understanding
why the state A disappears for high values of q, and why
the states B and C are not present when q is low.
As for the stability of the equilibria of Eq. (10), we
find that when mD < 2/3 both fD = 0 and fD = 1 are
stable fixed points, while fD = 1/2 is unstable. When
mD > 2/3 the stability properties become inverted, and
the only stable equilibrium is fD = 1/2.
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FIG. 5: Regions in the plane (mD, q) corresponding to differ-
ent stability properties of Eq. (9). (A) mD = 0 and mD = 1
are stable; (B) only mD = 0 is stable; (C) only mD = 1 is
stable.
The compatibility of these analytical results with our
previous numerical results can be assessed as follows. In
case A, we have mD = fD = 1/2, while the populations
of both males and females split into two groups adopting
the extreme values 0 and 1 for mD and fD. This agrees
with the observed results for low values of q. As mD <
2/3, fD = 0 and fD = 1 are stable. The results shown in
Fig. 5, in turn, indicate that when q > 1/2, fluctuations
in the value of mD can make the system to depart from
state A.
In case B, we have mD = 0 and fD = 1/2. Ac-
cordingly, the population of females splits in two groups
adopting the extreme values 0 and 1, while all males have
mD = 0. For q > 1/2, fluctuations may lead the whole
male population to abandon the strategy mD = 1 and
choose only mD = 0. Again, as mD < 2/3, fD = 0 and
fD = 1 are stable. However, when q < 1/2 unless a spe-
cific initial condition is selected, the system will converge
to state A.
For case C the analysis is analogous to caseB. Now, we
havemD = mD = 1 and fD = fD = 1/2. When q < 1/2,
fD = 1/2 is unstable, and mD splits between 0 and 1.
Again, when q > 1/2 the system can converge tomD = 1.
Once mD > 2/3, the only stable equilibrium is fD = 1/2.
Despite the fact that this analytical approach disregards
”microscopic details of the numerical simulations, thus,
it correctly describes the collective behavior of the two
populations in the three cases, and for small and large
values of the imitation probability.
CONCLUSION
We have presented a simplified model to mimic the
courtship process in humans as a game. Inspired by em-
pirical evidence, we have proposed a coordination game
where both players go better off by choosing the same
strategy, i.e. acting coordinately, but where at the same
time there are some constraints. Even when the best op-
tion for both players is to act in a coordinated way, there
is no coincidence as to which is the optimal individual
strategy. Consequently, coordination involves some kind
of concession from at least one of the players. This typical
situation is represented in the Battle of the Sexes. This
game has been extensively analyzed due to the interest
rising from the fact that it has two Nash equilibria, re-
flecting rational choices by the players. Rational players
would agree that the non-Nash outcomes are disadvan-
tageous, and that the Nash equilibria, even though one
is inferior to the other on each player’s opinion, are the
reasonable option. Neither player would want to produce
a disagreement that would lead to a non-Nash outcome,
even if this implies a conflict. In a population of play-
ers, this rationality is well described by the replicator
dynamics.
In our case, instead, we were interested at includ-
ing non-rational but still quantifiable motivations in our
players. Thus, we proposed a different dynamics, which
still favors the possibility that the players coordinate with
each other in order to mate. After unsuccessful inter-
actions each player will modify the strategy becoming
indulgent toward the opposite sex, even at the cost of
moving off from the favorite strategy. In the absence of
imitation, the dynamics is myopic, as the collected infor-
mation is only related to the personal history. The pro-
posed dynamics turns out to be non-payoff monotonic.
This fact induces a dynamical behaviour completely dif-
ferent from the one obtained from the replicator equa-
tions. We verified the emergence of different dynamical
equilibria and the change on the stability of the previ-
ously existing ones. Indeed, one of the most interesting
features is that the Nash equilibria are no longer stable
under this new dynamics. For some initial conditions,
in fact, the dynamics leads the populations towards the
most unfavorable situation. Decisions adopted by the
players make them end up in an undesirable situation,
far from the ideal coordinated outcome.
Further inclusion of social influence, in the form of im-
itation between males, adds to the behaviour of the sys-
tem another interesting feature. Tuning the intensity of
the imitation tendency we observe a transition between
qualitatively different asymptotic behavior. While the
imitation tendency is low the populations of both sexes
split into similar groups that asymptotically approach the
extreme values. As the imitation intensity among males
becomes larger , the whole male population is led to a
common pure strategy. The choice of the final state is
governed by microscopic fluctuations in the initial distri-
bution of strategies. Coordination seems to be enhanced
as the information is shared: while males adopt a unified
strategy, females fail to achieve the corresponding coordi-
nated strategy to maximize their collective payoff. This
7deviation from rationality is also to be ascribed to the
non-payoff monotonic character of the present courtship
game.
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